Fix an overflow for 10-digits OTP
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parent
0b93ea8653
commit
4d2024128e
19
otp.c
19
otp.c
@ -26,12 +26,20 @@ otp(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len, uint64_t counter,
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unsigned char md_value[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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uint8_t buf[8];
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uint32_t res;
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unsigned int md_len, modulo, offset;
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int32_t modulo;
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unsigned int md_len, offset;
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if (digits < 6 || digits > 10)
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return -1;
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for (modulo = 1000000; digits > 6; digits--, modulo *= 10)
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;
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/*
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* 10 digits would be 10_000_000_000, which overflows 32 bits.
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* Nevertheless, given the number construction, 10 digits OTP are
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* possible. We won't apply reminder operator in that case.
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*/
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if (digits < 10)
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for (modulo = 1000000; digits > 6; digits--, modulo *= 10)
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continue;
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/* convert counter to big endian */
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buf[0] = counter >> 56;
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@ -46,14 +54,15 @@ otp(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len, uint64_t counter,
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if (HMAC(evp_md, key, key_len, buf, sizeof(buf), md_value, &md_len) ==
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NULL)
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return -1;
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offset = md_value[md_len - 1] & 0xf;
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res = (md_value[offset] << 24) |
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(md_value[offset + 1] << 16) |
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(md_value[offset + 2] << 8) |
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md_value[offset + 3];
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res &= ~0x80000000;
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res &= 0x7fffffff;
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return (int32_t)res % modulo;
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return digits == 10 ? (int32_t)res : (int32_t)res % modulo;
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}
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int32_t
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